ARE U.S. FARM PROGRAMS GOOD PUBLIC POLICY? TAKING POLICY PERFORMANCE SERIOUSLY by Hopkins, Jeffrey W. & Taylor, Michael A.
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Jeﬀrey W. Hopkins and Michael A. Taylor ¤
Policy evaluation is on the minds of many in Congress as the 2002 expi-
ration date of existing farm program legislation approaches. For the past 70
years, farm policy has been dominated by the direct intervention of govern-
ment in providing farm income support (Eﬄand, 2000). While the intent to
support incomes has remained constant, there has been no easy consensus
on the matter of whether Congress should keep current programs intact and
increase funding levels or, instead, reform existing legislation. Having spent
more than $56 billion over the past three years in direct payments, much in
the form of ad-hoc assistance, the high costs of the current system ensure the
debate will continue. This paper oﬀers a modest ﬁrst step in extending the
standard economic analysis of current U.S. farm programs, using the tools of
distributional analysis and ethics-based evaluation.
Evaluating Public Policy
Economists, as should be expected, tend to focus on the eﬃciency of program
beneﬁt delivery when evaluating public policy programs. Ineﬃcient delivery
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1is wasteful and diverts scarce public funds away from other worthy uses.
Although eﬃciency may be desirable, it is doubtful whether eﬃciency alone
is an acceptable measure of public policy to society at large. As Randall
(1999) points out, the eﬃciency criterion carries ethical baggage that we
economists often overlook;
1. It is consequentialist (i.e., it determines the right action as the one that
brings the highest valued outcome),
2. It judges value in terms of a money metric of individual preference sat-
isfaction, and
3. It judges social welfare through simple aggregation, ignoring distribu-
tional concerns.
A broader concept of what constitutes “good” public policy will, among other
things, incorporate non-consequentialist ethical frameworks and will allow for
distributional concerns to be addressed.
Non-consequentialist theories do not judge the value of an action based
on its outcome. Instead, value is derived from acting in accordance with
a pre-existing code of ethics. Where consequentialists consider an action
as being right based on whether the outcome of the action is good, non-
consequentialists consider good actions as those that conform to some previ-
ous conception of what is right. These distinctions in how individuals may
judge the moral value of public policy complicate the evaluation process.
We live in a morally plural society. Moral pluralism can be thought of in
either of two ways. The ﬁrst is that society is comprised of individuals who
hold various ethical conceptions of what constitutes right and wrong (e.g.
consequentialist v. non-consequentialist). A second way of viewing moral
pluralism is that each individual will employ diﬀerent ethical frameworks de-
pending on the type of decision to be made. For example, the same individual
may make choices in the home based on an egalitarian concept of right and
wrong, but may use a utilitarian framework when faced with decisions in the
workplace. In either form, moral pluralism must somehow be accounted for
when evaluating public policy. The trick is not to ﬁnd public policies that
conform perfectly to a single ethical framework, for this will almost certainly
2result in the violation of the ethical norms of a substantial portion of society.
Instead, a heuristic for public policy evaluation that incorporates concepts
from multiple ethical frameworks must be used.
Thompson, et al (1994) introduce a framework for evaluating the accept-
ability of public policy in a morally plural society. It consists of a systematic
evaluation of public policy structure, conduct, and performance in light of
the social problem being addressed. Good public policy is that which is
morally acceptable to society. The process begins with an understanding
of the purpose of proposed or existing public policy and the existing pol-
icy setting. Public policy that is acceptable to a morally plural society will
have ethically acceptable structure, will promote ethically acceptable con-
duct, and will produce ethically acceptable outcomes. Acceptable structure
means that the redistribution of rights and obligations within the policy pro-
gram must be justiﬁed irrespective of policy program beneﬁts (Thompson,
et al., 1994). This requires the public policy to conform to some basic set of
non-consequentialist heuristics. Acceptable conduct means that the policy is
ethically acceptable, only if the elicited conduct is also ethically acceptable.
Acceptable performance means that the policy outcomes have to be ethically
acceptable. This addresses the consequentialists’ concern that the policy
that ought to be implemented is the one that produces the best outcomes.
This piecemeal approach allows for consideration of diverse conceptions of
moral value, recognizing that a single decision procedure that can guarantee
a unique and determinate answer involving the choice among fundamental
moral principles does not exist (Wolf, 1992).
This paper does not attempt a full analysis of the overall moral accept-
ability of farm programs as illustrated in Thompson, et al (1994). Instead, we
concentrate in general on the area of acceptable performance, and in particu-
lar on the distribution of program beneﬁts1. Our analysis uses distributional
analysis of farm program beneﬁts as a means of extending the economic
analysis of policy performance to incorporate potential policy goals.
1We direct readers interested in analysis of non-consequentialist concerns regarding the
acceptable structure of farm programs to Vorstenbosch (2000).
3Farm Policy Setting: Distributional Analysis
of Farm Program Beneﬁts
The distribution of farm policy program beneﬁts within the agricultural sec-
tor is calculated using data from the 1999 Agricultural Resources Manage-
ment Study (ARMS) survey. Farm policy beneﬁts are loosely approximated
based on the direct eﬀects of farm programs on farm proﬁtability and in-
come. Concentrating solely on the direct eﬀects of farm programs ignores
adjustments that farmer’s may make in the absence of farm programs. The
inclusion of the indirect eﬀects of farm programs (e.g., impacts on land and
other agricultural input costs) would provide the most complete picture of
farm program impacts, but is beyond the scope of the paper. Distributions
shown are for all farms meeting the oﬃcial deﬁnition of a farm, i.e. over
$1000 in agricultural sales, and are participating in government programs.
Figure 1 presents the distribution of pre-tax farm returns to farm business
assets, including farm program beneﬁts. Returns to farm business assets are
used as a proxy for farm business proﬁtability. The wide range in proﬁtabil-
ity levels is the result of diﬀerences in, among other things, management,
weather, and prices. The dotted lines in Figure 1 denote the maximum re-
turns to farm assets for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of farms and are
presented in Table 1.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of pre-tax household incomes with farm
program beneﬁts. The range in household incomes is aﬀected by the same
factors as farm proﬁt, in addition to diﬀerences in oﬀ-farm incomes. House-
hold incomes for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of all farms are denoted
by dotted lines and presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Farm Proﬁtability and Household Income with Program Beneﬁts
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
Return to Farm Business Assets -6.4% -2.1% 1%
Household Income $21,200 $43,500 $73,100
To calculate the direct impacts of farm program beneﬁts in terms of
farm proﬁtability, the return to asset ratio is re-computed with government
payments netted out of returns. Calculating the direct eﬀect on household
income is slightly more complex because farm business operations are some-
times shared between two or more households and because households that
4farm often have income from other sources, such as oﬀ-farm employment.
For these households, farm business income is ﬁrst share-adjusted to account
for any partnership, then government payments are netted out, and ﬁnally
any non-farm income is added to derive to total household income.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the direct eﬀects of farm program beneﬁts on
farm proﬁtability and household income without farm program beneﬁts, after
the adjustments detailed in the previous paragraph are made. Returns to
farm business assets and household income decline over the entire distribution
of farms as a result of the removal of program beneﬁts. Again, returns to
farm business assets and household incomes for the 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentile of all farms are denoted by dotted lines. The values are reported
in Table 2. At the median, direct payments increased the median rate of
return on assets by nearly 2 percentage points, from - 4% to - 2.1% , while
direct payments increased the median household income by $10,000, from
$33,500 to $43,500.
Table 2: Farm Proﬁtability and Household Income without Program Beneﬁts
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
Return to Farm Business Assets -8.7% -4.0% -1.2%
Household Income $12,700 $33,500 $62,600
Figures 5 and 6 explicitly show the calculated change in the level of prof-
itability or household income associated with any particular percentile of
farms. The percentiles of the distribution appear along the horizontal axis,
and the change in proﬁtability (Figure 5) and incomes (Figure 6) for each per-
centile appears along the vertical axis. The slope of the lines has an intuitive
interpretation. A ﬂat line signiﬁes a uniform eﬀect across every percentile,
which could result if every farm received an equal-sized payment. Lines
that are not ﬂat result when farms receive unequal payments. A downward-
sloping line indicates that the outcome associated with the lower end of the
distribution was improved more than the outcome at the upper end, or that
payment levels decreased as well-being increased. An upward-sloping line
indicates that payments disproportionately improved outcomes at the up-
per end of the distribution, or that payment levels increased as well-being
increased.
Note that the lines in Figures 5 and 6 are roughly U-shaped, indicating
that the eﬀects of direct government payments on the distribution of well-
being are mixed. Beginning with the eﬀect on farm proﬁts (Figure 5), the
5least proﬁtable farms enjoyed a ten-percentage point increase in the rate of
proﬁts. Note that despite the sharp increase at the lower end, the eﬀect
of payments on proﬁts leveled oﬀ to 2.5 percentage points throughout the
middle of the distribution, where proﬁts remained negative despite the eﬀect
of payments. Over the upper third of the proﬁt distribution, which includes
those farms that would have shown a proﬁt even absent the payments, the
eﬀect on proﬁts increased rapidly in proﬁt levels. To summarize, in 1999,
direct payments inﬂuenced the extremes of the distribution in a similar way,
boosting returns disproportionately for farms that had low and high rates
of return relative to other farms. The proﬁts of all other farms in between
the extremes were less inﬂuenced by direct payments, as their rate of return
increased by about two percentage points.
The Goals of Farm Policy
Recent congressional testimony, presumably designed to inﬂuence policymak-
ers, has suggested many goals for farm policy: the delivery of safe food at
reasonable prices, a fair ﬁnancial return for farmers, fair treatment of agricul-
ture in trade matters, and proper management of natural resources (Collins
2001). Likewise, a recent report by the Commission on 21st Century Produc-
tion Agriculture mentions the goals of an abundant supply of high-quality
agricultural products at reasonable prices, a prosperous and productive eco-
nomic climate for farmers, family farms, and high quality of life in rural areas
(Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture, 2001). This paper ex-
amines current farm policy in light of the two most often suggested goals of
farm policy: addressing the farm problem, and ensuring an adequate food
supply through eﬃcient production.
The “farm problem” is a phrase often used to describe economic diﬃ-
culties of the farm sector relative to the nonfarm sector. In particular, the
existence of low returns to farm businesses as well as farm households, and
high year-to-year volatility in returns due to the unique characteristics of
farm sector. The case for an endemic farm problem as most closely asso-
ciated with the Schultzian sectoral model (Gardner 1992). The Schultzian
model speciﬁes that, for agricultural products: (1) the demand is very in-
elastic, (2) the supply is very inelastic, (3) the demand increases slowly over
time, and (4) the supply increases more rapidly. The symptoms of the farm
problem are manifest in indicators of farmer and farm sector well-being, and
6include (1) low incomes relative to living expenses, (2) low rates of return to
agricultural assets, and (3) variability in both incomes and rates of return.
Relative to the goal of addressing the farm problem, the goal of promoting
eﬃciency in production seems straightforward. The policy goal of promoting
eﬃciency goes back even earlier than the goal of addressing the farm problem,
dating back to the 1820’s, when farmers began to promote the need for
specialized training and scientiﬁc research to advance the productivity and
professionalism of the industry (Eﬄand 2000). Later, productivity gains in
the agricultural sector were found to fuel development in other industries as
labor and resources were freed from food and ﬁber production. Productivity
in agriculture has increased greatly because of investments in research by
governments and also by the willingness of individual producers to invest
retained earnings into their businesses.
Scenario # 1: Evaluating Farm Programs as a Solution
to the Farm Problem
Assessing the severity of the farm problem, as well as attitudes towards ad-
dressing it, has been the subject of considerable study. See Gardner (1992)
and Bonnen and Schweikhardt (1998) for useful background. The ﬁrst symp-
tom, low well-being at the household level, is often viewed using a household-
level measure of income, wealth, or consumption. The second symptom,
low rates of return, focuses on the speciﬁc business of farming in which the
household is engaged, and is often viewed using a business-level measure of
proﬁtability, such as return on assets or equity. The third symptom, variabil-
ity, is sometimes viewed through the incidence of adverse outcomes, such as
personal bankruptcy or business dissolution. In all cases, the farm sector is
compared with itself across time or with non-farm households or businesses.
Evidence suggests that the farm problem, as conventionally deﬁned, no
longer exists. For example, USDA reports that the average income for a
farm household has been comparable to the average income for a nonfarm
household since the early 1970’s, save for the stretch of years between 1979
to 1985 (Gardner 1992; ERS 2001). Hopkins and Morehart (2000) also show
that the rate of proﬁt earned by the farm operations of households is compa-
rable to the rate of proﬁt earned by sole proprietorship businesses (such as
stores and other service providers) operated by non-farm households. Direct
assessments of the variability of incomes and returns to business assets is
7more diﬃcult, as data on individual households and businesses is not gen-
erally available over time. Nonetheless, Hopkins and Morehart (2000) note
that the distribution of returns for a farm business is much more compact
than the distribution of returns for nonfarm businesses, indicating that for
a given year proﬁts are more variable across ﬁrms in the nonfarm sector
than the farm sector. Another indicator of risk, the probability of business
dissolution, indicates that since 1985 the rate of involuntary and voluntary
dissolutions was up to ten percentage points lower for farm businesses than
nonfarm businesses, averaging two to six percent for farms over the period
(U.S. Small Business Administration 2000; Goodwin 2000; American Bankers
Association 2000).
We interpret the evidence on household incomes, business proﬁts, and
risk as indicators that the “farm problem” does not exist at the aggregate
level. However, distributional analysis provides some additional perspective,
demonstrating that the “farm problem” may still aﬀect a portion of farm
businesses and households. Recently, a new idea has been advanced that
farm policy should increase its eﬀorts to address those households below a
threshold of well-being, such as below a poverty line, through a safety net
mechanism (Harwood and Jagger 1999; Gunderson et al., 2000).
Figure 6 shows the eﬀects of farm program beneﬁts to be concentrated at
the extremes of the distribution of household incomes. The level of income
corresponding to the poorest households (including those with negative to
approximately $17,000 in total earnings) increased by up to $30,000. How-
ever, this high improvement in the level of well-being dropped oﬀ quickly and
settled near $10,000 over the middle percentiles of the distribution. From up-
wards of the 80th percentile of farm household income (with annual incomes
starting at $80,000 even absent the direct government payment) payment
levels increased in absolute amount.
Existing farm policy programs fail to meet the goal of providing an income
safety net for the poorest farm households. Even with program beneﬁts,
low income farms remain below the poverty level, while the very richest
farms receive similar program beneﬁts as poor farms in terms of increases in
incomes. Income safety net programs in non-farm sectors do a much better
job of targeting program beneﬁts to the poorest percentile of the distribution.
Figure 7 shows the eﬀect of social safety net-type beneﬁts in place for society
at large (payments such as now available as Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, or TANF). These payments, calculated for all non-farm households
using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) public microdata ﬁles for
81998, increased the outcome at the lower end by a smaller absolute amount
than payments to farm households, but the eﬀects were more targeted. Thus,
alternative policy designs could provide improved results in terms of a safety
net.
While targeting particular households is one way that a safety net might
operate, others propose to activate a safety net using a broader indicator of
overall sectoral well-being, such as the price of certain agricultural commodi-
ties. Presumably, such a safety net would be to the beneﬁt of all producers
regardless of income level or business proﬁtability. Increasing the range of
outcomes that the safety net addresses will, of course, add to its overall costs,
if the goal is to remain the achievement of a minimum income level of the
worst-oﬀ population.
Scenario # 2: Evaluating Farm programs as incentives
for increased productivity
According to Tweeten (1989) most eﬃciency improvements in agriculture
have resembled the scale-biased, labor-saving kind of technology, rather than
the scale-neutral, output-increasing kind of technology. Indeed, the history of
agricultural development in the U.S. conﬁrms that Schumpeter’s 1942 model
of creative destruction holds. Under this theory, entrepreneurs introduce new
products and processes, enjoy excess proﬁts for a time, and then are displaced
by subsequent innovators in a continuous process characterized by dramatic
increases in technical eﬃciency. Adoption of eﬃciency-increasing technology
involves the substitution of capital for labor and therefore requires the farmer
to have suﬃcient liquidity to ﬁnance adoption. Liquidity may be provided
either from the retained earnings of the farm business or from other liquidity
sources of the household. These conditions are met primarily by farms and
households that are least likely to exhibit symptoms of the farm problem, i.e.
have either low household incomes or unproﬁtable businesses or experience
high levels of variability in their stream of returns.
Therefore, the goal of promoting eﬃciency improvements is perhaps best
met by targeting support to larger farms. Supporting farms that are not ca-
pable of generating a suﬃcient level of economic surplus to invest in further
eﬃciency improvements would be pointless, if not counter-productive. Fi-
nancial support given unsuccessful farms may be used to subsidize ineﬃcient
production practices, or, perhaps worse, to aﬀord a level of consumption for
9the household that it otherwise would not be able to attain. Supporting
farms with high rates of return will have the greatest impact on eﬃciency,
as more of the support will go towards investment, and relatively little to
smoothing consumption.
As discussed earlier in the paper, program beneﬁts in terms of both re-
turns to asset (Figure 5) and household income (Figure 6) are concentrated in
the extremes of the distribution. However, an alternative program of direct
subsidy only to the most productive farms is unlikely to be pursued because
it would be in violation of international trade commitments. The WTO re-
quires that farm income support programs keep production decisions tied to
market signals, and although it is not concerned with the rationale or justiﬁ-
cation for diﬀerent programs, it is concerned with how programs aﬀect trade.
The potential for direct payments to distort the production decision, and by
extension trade ﬂows, rests largely on the wealth eﬀects brought about by
the payments (Young and Westcott 2000). Tielu and Roberts (1998) argue
that payments can distort production because producers receiving payments
are more attractive borrowers, and producers are likely to invest more with
payments than without payments, leading to higher production in the long
run. A guaranteed stream of payments may also elicit more risky behavior.
Because actions that use direct payments to improve eﬃciency violate
the acceptable conduct rule as put forth by the WTO, we cannot compare
the eﬃciency of farm policy with non-farm policy as we did with the safety
net objective. Therefore current policy, which in general is reported by the
U.S. to the WTO as exempted support (ERS 2001), may be the best way
to support this goal. We recommend further eﬀorts for attaining this goal
be devoted to ﬁnding programs that encourage productivity-enhancing in-
vestments that respond to market signals. In order to avoid diluting the
value of these programs, they should not be available to the lower end of the
distribution of households or farm businesses.
Conclusions
In summary, there is something to please as well as discourage those who
pursue either a safety net or food supply criterion. For safety net proponents,
the boost to the lower end of the distribution is undeniably welcome, as the
worst-oﬀ ﬁrms increased their returns by up to ten percentage points and
the worst-oﬀ households increased their incomes by up to $30,000. However,
10these eﬀects leveled oﬀ very quickly, and the worst-performing ﬁrms did not
become proﬁtable, nor did the lowest-income households exceed any common
poverty line as a result of the payments. For eﬃciency proponents, the
disproportionately greater payments to the most successful ﬁrms and to the
highest-income households likely also satisﬁes their objectives to an extent
because funds go disproportionately to highly eﬃcient and proﬁtable farms.
The two most commonly stated goals of current farm programs work
against each other. Payments going disproportionately to the successful ﬁrms
put those supported by the safety net in peril, as the payment given to suc-
cessful ﬁrms is pure surplus and likely invested either in land or other capital
assets. A lack of targeting, therefore, may exacerbate the performance gap.
Moreover, the outcomes of households at the lowest end of the distribution
do not exceed any common poverty line, a goal that likely could be achieved
at lower total program cost under targeted assistance.
Conversely, it is the payments going to the lower end at a disproportionate
rate that constrain the productivity improvements of successful businesses
and households. Payments going to unsuccessful ﬁrms and households bid
up the cost of further innovations for the highly successful producers, and
inhibit the ﬂow of resources to their most productive use. Although current
farm policy does allow incentives for agricultural productivity improvements,
a fully directed subsidy is not an option due to the WTO.
Distributional analysis allows for policy performance to be measured
along ethically pluralistic criteria. Because it can consider, rather than ig-
nore, a part of the ethical baggage brought on by the eﬃciency criterion
(chieﬂy the aggregation issue) it expands the economist’s standard policy
evaluation. Distributional analysis is also valuable because it monitors out-
comes on the population not targeted by programs, highlighting the impact of
unclear policy goals and the need for reforming delivery of program beneﬁts.
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Figure 1. Cumulative Distribution of Returns on Assets, 1999




































Figure 2.  Cumulative Distribution of Total Household Income, 1999




































Figure 3. Returns on Assets without Government Payments, 1999




































Figure 4. Total Household Income without Government Payments, 1999






Figure 5. Increase in Return on Assets from Direct Payments, 1999
















































18Figure 6. Increase in Household Incomes from Direct Payments, 1999

























































Figure 7. Effect of Govt. Payments on Nonfarm Household Income
Proportion of Total Households Ordered by Incomes
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